The complaint alleges damages of $300,000.Ī pending 2019 complaint alleges that as a representative of Merrill Lynch, William Thon misrepresented and recommended unsuitable mutual fund investments. Thon is a former representative of Merrill Lynch, according to information drawn from Financial Industry Regulatory Authority records.Ī pending 2019 complaint alleges that as a representative of Merrill Lynch, William Thon recommended unsuitable investments. Settled and pending investor complaints against former Guaynabo, Puerto Rico broker and investment advisor William Thon (CRD#: 1485103) allege conduct including suitability violations, misrepresentations, over-concentration, and more.
The failure ever to produce them or by affidavit to account for their nonproduction again compels the conclusion that the District Judge did not abuse her discretion in applying the sanctions described.William Thon: Complaints Against Guaynabo Financial Advisor Moreover, the corporate records sought here appear to be pertinent to the litigation and would normally be expected to be readily obtainable. The record here, as indicated in the statement of facts, fully supports the finding that Fullana had willfully failed to appear for his deposition for more than seven months. "But here as in other areas of the law, the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must be available to the District Court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent." Id. 2778, 49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976), reversing a Third Circuit judgment which had reversed the dismissal of an action for failure to timely answer written interrogatories, that there is a tendency for reviewing courts to be heavily influenced by the severity of the sanctions under Rule 37. The Supreme Court has recently observed in National Hockey League v. Where sanctions are imposed under Rule 37, Fed.R.Civ.P., the question is not whether this court, as an original matter, would have applied them, but whether the district court abused its discretion in so doing. We affirm the judgment below in all respects. On appeal, IMPR argues that the penalty of a default judgment was unwarranted on the facts of this case.
PAINE WEBBER PUERTO RICO PLUS
The judgment awarded Paine Webber was in the amount of $285,000 with interest from November 1, 1972, plus expenses, including attorney's fees, of $3,743.50.
PAINE WEBBER PUERTO RICO FULL
Otero, allegedly while defendant's exclusive agency contract with Paine Webber was in full force and effect. The financing was ultimately obtained from the Housing Investment Corporation, a subsidiary of the Chase Manhattan Bank, through the services of an independent broker, Juan J. The underlying cause of action was a suit by Paine Webber to recover a brokerage commission for services rendered in obtaining financing for the construction of IMPR's condominium hotel (Apartotel) in Puerto Rico. (IMPR), dismissing defendant's counterclaims with prejudice, and granting plaintiff Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Incorporated (Paine Webber) a default judgment against IMPR. 37(b)(2) striking the amended answer of defendant Inmobiliaria Melia de Puerto Rico, Inc. Constance Baker Motley, Judge, entered judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. On January 22, 1976, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Hon.
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